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When Can We Say, “I Remember …”?

The next step in our investigation of the concept of remembering, or human memory, is to ask how the verb “to remember” in its first person use is learned. By this we can detect the manifold applications of the expression and, thereby, the complexity of the concept. There is a certain danger connected with conceptual analyses of which Norman Malcolm wanted to warn us. In his *Memory and Mind* he delivers a mild criticism of Munsat’s treatment of memory. He says that he, like many other philosophers, has a tendency of “over-intellectualising” memory. Instead of realising that the words “memory” and “remember” are used in a huge spectrum of cases, he says, Munsat thinks that there is a genuine and most proper use of “memory” which involves the judgement or claim, “This occurred”.¹ This criticism does not appear unrestrictedly justified if we take into account the whole of Munsat’s book, but more generally we have reason to take heed of what Malcolm says in the same connection:

> Philosophers feel tempted to concentrate on a portion of the total range and fix on it as “memory in the fullest sense” or as “genuine” memory. But these stipulations are unjustified.²

The method of looking at the way in which an expression first is learned is one that also Wittgenstein advocated. Before undertaking this analysis of “I remember” we should, however, notice that Wittgenstein has been criticised for what he seemed to demonstrate through this kind of conceptual investigation. One criticism is delivered by A. J. Ayer in his book on Wittgenstein. Ayer has understood his account of how we learn the concept of pain in the following way:

> […] just as we are taught the use of the words that refer to physical objects by being placed in situations where we undergo sense-experiences which are held to correspond with those of our teachers, so we are supplied with a vocabulary for describing our mental life through analogies which are drawn from our behaviour.³

At this point already Ayer’s version can be said to be a misrepresentation of Wittgenstein’s view. Nowhere does he say that we learn the names of physical objects by being placed in particular situations. (We are not trained to use those words.) Neither does Wittgenstein suppose that the people from whom we learn new words and expressions hold that we undergo similar sense-experiences to those of our teachers. People just show us things and tell us what they are called, if indeed they sometimes are as ostensive as this. Most of the time they name things in the passing, or when they tell us to bring them something or to look out for some thing, and so forth, and so on. In short, the situations in which we learn new words are natural. In a similar way we learn to speak about the mental. People tell us spontaneously—they do not draw analogies—that we are sad because we look and act sad, or that we are in pain because they can see we are suffering.

² Ibid.
³ Ayer, 77.
Ayer recognises that Wittgenstein also pointed out that we learn to use words in the context in which they occur. Ayer thinks that this applies especially to words which stand for various types of thought. In his description these contexts are acts of speaking and writing which are counted as their expressions, circumstances in which these expressions occur, and the behaviour with which they are causally connected. However, what Ayer does not concede is that the meaning of the words is tied to the contexts in which they are originally learned. Wittgenstein’s dictum, “An ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria”, he says, is only pedagogically true.4

Again we could say that Ayer does not fully grasp Wittgenstein’s argument. Why should acts of speaking and writing be counted as expressions of thoughts? What if somebody did not count them as such? Wittgenstein’s point is that when we speak and write, this is the expression of our thoughts.5 And when Ayer says that there is behaviour with which our thoughts are causally connected, this is again a misinterpretation of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein did not say that there is a causal connection between our thoughts and behaviour. His view was rather that the connection is conceptual, not causal. We have not discovered this connection through observation, but the very concept of a thought presupposes that of behaviour.

The intrinsic connection between the meaning of words and the contexts in which they are originally learned does not, however, obtain only for words conveying various kinds of thought. This is something that goes for our linguistic expressions in general although Ayer thinks he has a counter-example:

An obvious counter-example is our understanding of references to the past. No doubt a child’s conception of the past is originally linked to the exercise of his memory. It is by having his attention drawn to events which his teacher expects him to remember that he learns the use of the past tense. This does not prevent him from being able quite soon to distinguish between past events in general and the very small fraction of them which he remembers; and once he has succeeded in making this distinction he can come to understand that even when he does remember an event, his remembering it is not a necessary condition of its being past.6

It seems plausible that a child’s ability to remember events is conducive to his learning the use of the past tense. Some of the situations where a child learns to think about the past, to speak about events in the past tense, are situations where he is reminded of something he has experienced. But why should we think that his ability to remember is the only factor making up the proper context of learning to speak about previous events in his own life? And why should this be sufficient for learning to speak about the past in general? In the latter case, as well as in the former, there are a number of circumstances that go together with speaking of the past. One prominent condition is, for instance, that a person who professes to tell us something about a past event must be able to answer our question, “When?” in a satisfactory

4 Cf. Ayer, 77.
5 Even if we took Ayer to mean that the acts of speaking and writing are counted as the expressions of the thoughts, this does not alter the objection made here. We do not merely suppose that what a person says and writes is the proper expression of his thoughts, for we could not imagine what it would be to ordinarily say and write other than what we thought. It is, in other words, a conceptual, not contingent, truth that we generally say and write what we think.
6 Ayer, 77 f.
way. “How do you know?” is another question that even a small child knows he must be able to answer in order to be taken as talking about the past.

Peter Winch has made the observation that the concepts in terms of which a person expresses what he remembers are drawn from a background of a causal understanding of the circumstances. Winch’s point is that our understanding of causal connections in our environment makes out a background against which we remember, not only in words, but also through what we do. “This pen is something I reach for in my pocket (thus expressing my memory of where I put it), hold in a certain rather complicated way, and write with (thus expressing my understanding of how a pen behaves and how it is to be used)”.

In his book David Cockburn has drawn attention to the way in which learning to speak about things in our surroundings furthers our understanding of the things as something having continuous existence. Thus a little child who looks for his ball and is told that it was in the garden yesterday probably will go out in the garden to look for it there. To see how the past tense enters into other situations we may imagine circumstances in which someone may say to a little child, “The doorbell rang”, “Mum put them on the bed”, “You haven’t brought it to me yet”, and so on.

The circumstances in which expressions in the past tense are used, including the fact that the speaker generally admonishes, directs, exhorts, explains, etc. by what he says, constitute the contexts for speaking of the past. These contexts for speaking of the past may differ from situation to situation but understanding references to the past involves understanding these contexts. A small child learns them by being corrected when what he says does not fit the context. Contrary to what he thinks, Ayer’s example shows precisely that “the meaning of the words is indissolubly tied to the contexts in which they are originally learned”.

Having said this much, we may now move to investigate how a child may learn the use of the word “remember” in the first person. It might be thought that “I remember” expresses something the truth of which is dependent on whether the person using the expression performs a certain mental act or not. But if we look at the kinds of move one can do with the expression, we can find that remembering, as well as not remembering, cannot be described as a specific phenomenon to begin with.

We may suppose that the first connection in which a small child will learn the first person use of “remember” will not be very complicated. He will, for instance, not first learn to say something like, “I remember once when …” He is much more likely first to learn to answer “Yes” or “No” to questions containing the verb in the past tense. The child may, for instance, be asked by his mother going out with him on a cold winter’s day, “Did you remember to bring your mittens?”, or his father may ask him if he remembered to wash his hands before dinner. In the first case he may have been told to remember to take his mittens and in the second he is asked if he remembered something he has learned he should do.

In learning to answer “Yes” to the questions whether he had remembered to bring something or do something, the child learns the circumstances in which it is correct to say “I remembered”. The child would have to be able to produce the mittens in the one case, and to have clean hands in the other. If the child failed to remember, this would not be a matter of his

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7 Cf. Winch 19, 100.
8 Ibid.
9 Cf. Cockburn,
10 Ayer, 77.
not having performed a mental act. The requirements for saying that he had not remembered would be that he had not done what he was supposed to do and that there were no other reasons for this.

The kind of remembering that is involved in our two cases where the child might say, “Yes, I remembered to do it”, John A. Meacham and Burt Leiman call “prospective remembering”. But actually the word “remember” need not be used at all in these connections. The mother might equally well ask, “Did you bring …?”, and the father, “Did you wash …?” In fact it is probable that with quite small children you would prefer the latter form of question rather than using the word “remember”. In other connections talking of remembering might be of help in correcting a child’s behaviour. A small child may not understand that it is wrong to hit another person but his parents will tell him that he must not do it. If, nevertheless, he one day hits his playmate, his mother may say to him, “Don’t you remember I’ve told you that you must never hit anybody!”

The examples which have been mentioned show, I think, that we may talk about remembering where we might forget, that is, that the concept of remembering in many cases is secondary to that of forgetting. If we did not, at times, forget to do what we otherwise would do, we would not say we remembered to do it. Also, the examples show that acquiring habits and modes of action are preconditions for individuals to be talked of as remembering and forgetting. With respect to small children their “sweetie day” and a list, perhaps a ditty containing the days of the week precede their ability to say that they will get sweets on Saturday. Only when such routines have been built up, breaks may occur, for example, due to forgetfulness.

Being cases where we do not need to use many words to show we remembered, our examples of prospective remembering resemble some other instances of remembering where the person who remembers may not be able to put into words what he remembers. A person may be able to find his way out of a maze without being able to tell beforehand how one should go. Saying, “I remember the right way” when a party of people has been caught in a maze amounts to, “I can lead you out”. In a corresponding way a child may learn to say, “I remember how to do it” when trying to unlock a door, switch on a TV set, or the like. In situations such as these his understanding of the words “I remember” will first show in his answering “Yes” to the question if he remembers how to do a certain thing and then doing it. His remembering will consist in his ability to perform the operation and not in any mental goings on.

Yet another basic form of remembering where a child may learn the meaning of “I remember” are situations where a child may be able to show that he remembers a person, an animal, or a picture, for instance. A mother may ask her little son or daughter if he or she remembers a person. From the child’s reactions she can tell whether he does remember and, if he does, may say, “So you remember the nice uncle!” This type of remembering a person resembles rather the kind of recognition Munsat talks of in connection with animals. This is because the child is not likely to be able to describe the person but can only show he remembers through his behaviour when he sees the person. Although we may expect that it is quite a complex matter to learn to say “I remember” in this situation, hearing his mother say that he remembers the person in connection with his reactions plays an important role. Here, without doubt, there will be some mental reaction involved, for instance, joy at seeing the person again, but it is important to notice that the truth of “Yes, I remember him” is not dependent on anything

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11 Cf. Meacham, 327 f.
12 I am indebted to Lars Hertzberg and the members of his philosophy seminar for the ideas developed here.
mental. The truth of the judgement has rather to do with what could be established about the other person, about his having met the child before, and with the fact that the reactions of the child had to do with his seeing the person again. All these factors make up the context within which the expression can be learned and correctly used.

An important step in learning to master “I remembered” and “I forgot” is when the child learns to justify actions or make excuses using those expressions. Asked why he had gone out quite suddenly in the afternoon instead of doing his homework, a schoolboy may answer that he had just remembered that his best friend was going on a holiday with his family that afternoon. And asked by his teacher why he had not done his homework another boy may say that he had forgotten to do it. The question whether the justifications and excuses are acceptable is dependent on many factors. For instance, a small child may be excused for completely forgetting about his homework once or twice, but an older pupil has no excuse. On the other hand, there may be extenuating circumstances even for the older pupil at some occasions. In other words, how “I did not remember” may be used here depends on, among others, moral matters.

The more complicated uses of “I remember” are likely to follow the basic forms of remembering discussed earlier. We may here think about objects and events in the past that the child can say he remembers. He may, for instance, be reminded by his parents about a toy he once had, or may be asked if he remembers something that happened to him some time ago. In order to be able to say he remembers the red ball he used to play with in the garden, the child must have learned to describe past times. Without having the concepts by which one can refer to something in the past, a person cannot be said to remember in this sense and thus cannot use the expression “I remember” about himself.

As we shall see presently, being able to say that one remembers something from a certain time presupposes that one was aware of what one later remembers at the time it happened. This means that one must have been able to say to oneself what happened, or how things were, at the time from which one’s memories are. The fact that our earliest childhood memories seldom reach back beyond the age of three is a case in point. Of course some people have sporadic “memories” from their very early childhood, but they are more or less like unconnected flashes. William James cited the case of Melville Ballard, an instructor at the National College in Washington, who was born deaf. Ballard maintained that as a little child, long before he had learned his native English through learning to read and write, he had thought about questions like the origin of the universe and human life.\(^{13}\) Although James used this example to illustrate the qualitative difference between language and thought, it leaves a vital question unanswered. How would Ballard be able to tell us more about things related to the “memories”, about the circumstances in which that from which he had his memory flashes happened? If he could not, it is, of course, understandable since he hardly was able, at the time, to understand his surroundings and what was happening. Even if what he said he could remember was not just something he had learned, for example, from his mother and he himself had imagined, we may, however agree with Wittgenstein in his comment that this was not an example of remembering as we usually use the word.\(^{14}\)

\(^{13}\) Cf. James, 1:266–67.

\(^{14}\) Wittgenstein 1953, sec. 342: – Are you sure—one would like to ask—that this is the correct translation of your wordless thought into words? And why does this question—which otherwise seems not to exist—raise its head here? Do I want to say that the writer’s memory deceives him? – I don’t even know if I should say *that*. These recollections are a queer memory phenomenon, —and I do not know what conclusions one can draw from them about the past of the man who recounts them.
We could, in other words, say that a child must have learned to speak, or more precisely, must have acquired language to remember past events or objects not present any longer in the sense that we think of when we talk of adults remembering them. The failure to see this has given rise to many futile explanations within psychology where the lack of memories from early infancy has been regarded as the result of something called childhood amnesia. One of the explanations of this “childhood amnesia” has, for instance, been delivered by Ernest G. Schachtel who has employed psychoanalytic theory to the question.\textsuperscript{15} But if we cannot say that a child who has no language can have memories, we cannot speak about childhood amnesia either. (It is then quite another question if we connect “childhood amnesia” with later stages than the pre-lingual stage.)

At this point someone might want to object that of course a small child may be able to remember a red ball, for instance, although he has not yet learned to speak. He may, for example, be able to imagine to himself the ball in the garden where he used to play with it. The size of the ball, its colour and softness will be present to his mind. But how could we tell that such a child remembered the ball? If he had no language in which to describe the ball to us, we would not be able to say that he remembered it. But, our objector might ask, even if he could not describe his memory-image to us, might he not be able to have this memory for himself? The problem here is that if there were no way for him to describe the ball to others, there would be no way for him of relating his imaging to the actual ball. There would be no distinction between a mistake and a true memory. In other words, we could not speak of the child having memory-images or memories in the first place.

The ability to talk of the past, to have concepts referring to the past, is a prerequisite when it comes to the very important use of “remember” in judgements starting with the words, “I remember that ...”. Judgements of this type, also sometimes called memory claims, are used to express what Norman Malcolm has called “factual memory”. When a person says, “I remember that ...,” we could say that what follows is a fact of some kind. Such facts can be about events in his own life, that is, events of which he has personal memories. They may also be about events before his lifetime, something of which he cannot have any personal memories, or of events he has not witnessed for other reasons. But the facts need not be only about events. They may have to do with other things he has learned, for instance, all the facts you can learn in school subjects such as geography and mathematics.

It might now be thought that when a person makes a memory claim of this sort and exhibits an instance of factual memory, this, to be sure, involves some inner processes. The task of the philosopher, it might be said, is to construct a theory of the relation between the processes within the person and the manifestation of his memory. Some such outlook Mary Warnock represents when she discusses Malcolm’s treatment of factual memory. The objection that must be made to Warnock’s view is not that it is wrong to assume that there are some sorts of inner phenomena, whether physiological processes or mental capacities. The objection, rather, is that the task of the philosopher is not to create theories of any kind but to perform conceptual analyses. Through his analysis the philosopher may find that some of the theories held in a field of investigation are misleading because they are built on a false understanding of the concepts involved. And this is what must be said about Warnock’s own treatment of factual memory.

\textsuperscript{15} Cf. Schachtel, 192.
In her criticism of Malcolm Mary Warnock especially concentrates on his view that there is no causal relation between present memory and the past, of which it is the memory. In his paper “A Definition of Factual Memory” Malcolm has stated the conditions for calling something factual memory in the following way:

Our definition of factual memory can now be stated in full as follows: A person, B, remembers that \( p \) from a time, \( t \), if and only if B knows that \( p \), and B knew that \( p \) at \( t \), and if B had not known at \( t \) that \( p \) he would not now know that \( p \).16

Warnock rejects this definition on the grounds that it says that the knowledge a person has through memory must be the same he had at the time from which he has his memory.17 She would like to allow a much more liberal interpretation of “knowledge”. A person may be said to have knowledge of something happening as long as he is conscious of it, although he does not know exactly what is happening. Thus, she says, though a person does not understand until later that something he experiences is described as “indigestion”, or “sexual curiosity”, or “the last sight he ever had of the Queen Mary”, he may be said to remember these things.18

What Warnock does not, however, take enough notice of is the difference between knowing that something is happening and knowing what is happening. From the time something is happening of which one is aware without knowing what, one can only remember that something happened. If one learns later on what it was, what one may remember is additionally the fact that what one experienced is called so and so. Far from being counterexamples to Malcolm, Warnock’s examples go to show that what a person can say he remembers to have happened must correspond to what he could have said he knew was happening from witnessing it. If she had imagined a court scene where a witness was asked if he remembered that the defendant escaped from the scene of the crime in a certain car, she might have realised how important the agreement between what one knew at the time of the events and what one remembers is. If our imagined witness could not identify the defendant as the same man he had seen, that is, if he could not recognise him from something he noticed when the crime took place, he would do wrong in answering “Yes” to the question.19

When Malcolm concludes that saying of somebody that he remembers is like saying that he knows now because he knew then, Warnock takes him to task for denying that the word “because” signals a causal link. Malcolm’s argument is that we cannot talk of a causal link between what a person knew before and remembers now because remembering presupposes conceptually that one knew before.20 Warnock most apparently misses the point when she almost overbearingly points out that there is a conceptual gap between knowing now and knowing then: “It is the most obvious gap in the world: that between the past and the present. It is a temporal gap. The very words ‘past’ and ‘present’, implicit in our concept of recollection, point to the existence of this gap.”21

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16 Malcolm 1963, 236.
17 Cf. Warnock, Mary, 45.
18 Cf. ibid., 44.
19 A point that might also be made in this connection is that Warnock’s three examples do not necessarily conform to the general form of claims of factual memory. What Malcolm discusses in his article is the conditions for saying that a person “remembers that \( p \)”. Warnock’s examples allow for both claims of this form and claims where a person says he “remembers having \( x \)”, or, “remembers being excited by \( y \)”, or, “remembers seeing \( z \)”.
21 Warnock, Mary, 45.
Malcolm’s treatment of the concept of a source in connection with memory does not fare better in Warnock’s eyes, either. If a person remembering does not have his knowledge from any other source distinguishable from the event from which he has his original knowledge, his original knowledge can be spoken of as the “source” of his present knowledge, Malcolm says. As he also remarks, “source” here again has no causal implications in distinction to the causal implications it would have if what one knew was something one had learned just now over again.\(^{22}\)

In her eagerness to find a conceptually independent use of “cause” in connection with remembering Warnock turns to G. E. M. Anscombe. She finds support in Anscombe’s remark that memory is not simply knowledge of the past but knowledge caused by the past.\(^{23}\) Anscombe says that causality in connection with something one knows because one has witnessed it is “an original phenomenon of causality”.\(^{24}\) What she does here is to stress the difference between knowing that something has occurred through witnessing it and getting to know it in some other way.\(^{25}\) She also writes that it is analytically implied that the original witnessing of a remembered event is a cause of any present memory. With respect to the source of a person’s present knowledge she says that if it is his having witnessed the event, this is enough to determine that the knowledge is memory. And she concludes, “This belongs in an account of how we use the word ‘memory’. But also, of how we use the word ‘source’ in connexion with knowledge.”\(^{26}\)

Warnock now seizes upon this elaboration of the concepts of a cause and source of a memory to see how much can be said about causes and sources of memories. She finds that even if one’s witnessing an event is taken as a cause and the memory of it as the effect, this does not provide an explanation of the phenomenon of remembering. The most we can say is that the past and the present are related somehow.\(^{27}\) This is because, as she says, “[w]e are not allowed to bring the relation into a wider category of causal relations in general.”\(^{28}\)

Whereas she recognises that memory cannot be explained by reference to causes in a mechanical sense, Warnock goes on to argue that explanations of memory are causal in a metaphorical sense. In a similar way our talk of the source of a memory is to be taken metaphorically. This is the way, she says, in which Anscombe speaks of the source of knowledge.\(^{29}\) In arguing for her view, Warnock concludes with the following words on the usefulness of the causal metaphor:

> Considering these metaphors, there is one further feature of them to be noticed, a feature they have in common. In the case of the causal chain, the great central metaphor of mechanical causation, the beauty of the metaphor is the visible continuity between one end of the chain and the other. Each link is physically connected with the next, and if the links fall apart, if the chain is cut, the occurrences at one end of the chain have no further effect on the occurrences at the other end. Continuity is afforded by the chain, in this case a physical and spatial continuity. Even if we change the metaphor and talk about sources,

\(^{22}\) Cf. Malcolm 1963, 234.
\(^{23}\) Cf. Anscombe, Elizabeth, 24.
\(^{24}\) Ibid.
\(^{25}\) Cf. ibid., 16.
\(^{26}\) Ibid., 28.
\(^{27}\) Cf. Warnock, Mary, 48 f.
\(^{28}\) Ibid., 49.
\(^{29}\) Ibid. 50.
continuity is still demanded. We will not think of the spring as the source of the river unless we believe that somewhere, even if invisible, perhaps underground, the water is continuous with the water we later identify as the river. The continuity in such a case is more complicated and more obscure ... But that there is physical continuity is implicit in the use of the word ‘source’. We perhaps prefer the visible or felt continuity of clockwork, or the links in the chain. But where clockwork looks implausible, the continuity of water, continuously flowing from the source to the river mouth, is quite good instead. And so if a man’s being present at a particular scene can be thought of as the source of his knowledge (in the case where he remembers and has not been told) then there is, written into this metaphor, the notion of continuity between then and now, a physical continuity between past and present.  

From this rather lengthy quotation we can see that there are above all two points that Warnock wants to bring home. The continuity of knowledge when we remember is “more complicated and more obscure” than the continuity of a chain. But notwithstanding this and the fact that its source, like the underground source of a river, is invisible, it still is implicitly a physical continuity. The other point is that the physical continuity may consist in a person’s presence at a particular scene and his knowledge now. But both these points are open to objections which further show that Warnock’s idea that this continuity might be reduced to physiological processes in a person’s eyes, ears and brain is mistaken.  

If we take the latter point first, we could say that accepting the fact that a person has been present at the scene as the source of his knowledge or memory later of what happened does not concern what might have gone on in his nervous system. The point is that we accept his having been there as a warrant that he knows what happened at the time it happened and thus, negatively, that what he knew later was not something he had learned second hand after, or, for that matter, during or even before the event. The source of his present memory must, in other words, be what he knew through being present at the time.

The assertion in the last sentence is a logical remark. In effect this is just what G. E. M. Anscombe tries to make clear in her exposition. She also makes a point out of the fact that there is a logical, or conceptual, link between the knowledge through having witnessed an event and remembering it. Hence her inculcation that we use “cause” and “source”, though quite legitimately, in original ways. But if we here have to do with conceptual links, the whole idea of bringing in physiological theory to explain the continuity involved is uncalled-for.  

Perhaps the debate between Warnock and Malcolm is quite unnecessary. The two contracting parties may simply have different scopes. Malcolm has concentrated on the connection between being aware of an event and remembering it. He might have met Warnock half way if the point had been made that there is a causal link between something happening in the world and your becoming aware of it. It is this point Anscombe can be taken to address when she says that memory is not simply knowledge of the past but knowledge caused by the past. Her words, “an original phenomenon of causality”, are very apt to describe the situation when a person is aware of something that happens because he witnesses it. The event is the cause and source of his knowledge of it.

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30 Ibid., 51  
31 Cf. Warnock, Mary, 52.
The upshot of Anscombe’s analysis of personally remembering an event and the meanings of “cause” and “source” in such a connection is, in other words, in agreement with Malcolm’s treatment of the subject. In another place Malcolm points out very clearly that just because we talk about our previous knowledge of an event from having been present at the time as the cause of our memory, there can be no talk about a process in the matter. He asks us to look at the word “cause” and see if it is used in a way suggesting a process, for example, a flame fed by the continuous flow of gas through a pipe. I tend to agree with his remark: “The fact that the belief in the necessity of a continuous causal link in memory is ‘widely appealing’ only serves to illustrate how difficult it is in philosophy to see differences in the use of a word.”

On the other hand, Warnock’s focus is on the continuation of one’s knowledge from having witnessed an event. But there is nothing controversial or irreconcilable with that and Malcolm’s point. In fact, what she says about personal identity is quite sound. She discusses John Locke’s distinction between being the same man and being the same person and finds his differentiation unwarranted. She stresses that the over-riding criterion for sameness of persons is physical continuity of body over time.

She continues,

And that our bodily identity feels complex; that it is confirmed by the inner knowledge of our past which memory brings, should not in the least surprise us, if we reflect that memory itself is necessarily connected with, and a part of, the brains and bodies that we have. If memory of the past is, as I have argued in the previous chapter, caused by what has happened to us, that is to our bodies and our brains, it is no surprise that the continuity over time of those bodies should, at least sometimes, be confirmed by memory-knowledge.

Indeed, one cannot but agree when she says that the mind is not another thing to be considered separately from the body. The outlook of this book is in agreement with Warnock’s statement, “In the typical or normal case of a man, the man is a person who remembers things that have happened to him, not all of them, it is true, and he may be puzzled as to why he remembers some things and not others; but often he does remember.”

33 Cf. Warnock, Mary, 69.
34 Ib., 69f.
35 Cf. ib.
36 Ib.