Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) is regarded as one of the most important philosophers in the 20th-century. Analytic philosophers mistakenly characterized his post-1936 writings as ‘philosophy of language’.

At present, it is largely agreed that this characterization is not appropriate. Post-1936 Wittgenstein is not scientifically to be theoretically (separably) understood. However, it is neither a (non-separable) humanistic approach. Usually we anthropocentrically confine language only to human beings. This concerns, for example, also anthropological, primatological, and psychological topics. It concerns present readings of post-1936 Wittgenstein as human investigations (see Hacker). This is why Hacker (and others) regards human reading of Wittgenstein as being set in the latter part of 1936. When reading Wittgenstein like this we have not so far faced any larger problems with his post-1936 texts.

However, presently we also find an enigma in his post-1936 texts that is not well understood. We can ask if humans are the only species that has language competence. Is the human way to understand post-1936 Wittgenstein then necessarily a correct view? Do we really need to understand it differently? Due to recent scientific advancements, these are intriguing questions and we need to answer them when considering animal language. When visiting Department of Philosophy at University of Uppsala in 2006 and 2007, assistant professor Pär Segerdahl encouraged me to do this kind of investigations concerning Wittgenstein. This book is the result of this encouragement.

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Today there is another way of understanding this problem. It originates in the experimental result, concerning a language-using bonobo, performed by Sue

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1 A number of analytic philosophers (like the sociologist/social-anthropologist Gellner) advocate some ‘separable’ (theoretical) view assumed to characterize Wittgenstein’s post-1936 philosophy. We have other examples as well. For example, just look at Hintikka’s ‘realist’ and Dummett’s ‘anti-realist’ separable analytic research programs where ‘philosophy of language’ is the ‘foundation’ of all other philosophy.
Savage-Rumbaugh & al. in 1993. They succeeded because they avoided teaching language to the bonobo. Instead, they had to wait and see if the bonobo would spontaneously respond to this cultural environment precisely as human children do. And, yes, it did spontaneously respond. Later the experiment has been repeated with different kinds of hominids. Concerning ‘language’, this changes everything. This successful result performed in 1993 was by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) regarded as one of the most important experiments in the 20th-century. When recognizing this experiment we need to be very careful. The experiment itself is not set in anthropocentric context. We then need to clarify what we mean by this claim.

In 2004, I was lucky enough to have the opportunity to read the manuscript of a forthcoming book by Segerdahl, Fields, and Savage-Rumbaugh, almost a year before its publication. I noticed that the authors, in the book called Kanzi’s Primal Language: The Cultural Initiation of Primates into Language (2005), quote Wittgenstein’s post-1936 texts on a number of pages. The way the authors read these quotations intrigued me. They did not quote them in the way one presently is accustomed to read them. I decided to investigate their way to read the quotations. I also wanted to formulate this outlook more thoroughly by writing comments clarifying these readings.

One notices that the book by Segerdahl, Fields, and Savage-Rumbaugh (2005) uses Wittgenstein’s post-1936 terminology. The way the authors read Wittgenstein’s comments concerning language and philosophy is therefore of crucial importance. It is important because it concerns the way one, after 1993, due to the (canonical) experiment that established bi-cultural human/animal understanding, is to read Wittgensteins post-1936 comments on language and philosophical investigations. After 1993, we can (and we have to) read Wittgenstein’s post-1936 comments on language and philosophy as having different sense without changing the formulation itself in any way. When understanding ‘language’ having different sense it also gives us novel outlook on conceptual (philosophical) problems. Then one after 1993 actually is reading

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3 The experiment was originally by AAAS regarded as a contribution to anthropocentric (empirical and rational) Cognitive Science. Later Savage-Rumbaugh & al changed their original positive position concerning anthropocentric view in primal language research.

Wittgenstein’s post-1936 terminology having another sense. It is then crucial that one clarifies this outlook.

Philosophers today usually read Wittgenstein’s comments concerning language as recognising the human/animal dichotomy. That is, they have an anthropocentric view on language. Then only humans are regarded as having competence of language. We may then again ask if this reading is correct. On present evidence, it is not. For example, we read in Philosophical Investigations that ‘If a lion could talk, we could not understand him’. Philosophers presently view this as an argument that Wittgenstein sharply separates between human and animal. However, if we carefully look at what he says just prior to this sentence then one notice that he says the same of humans – there are humans who talk, but whom we do not understand, because they have another culture. Then the lion occurring in the sentence above does not stand for ‘Animal’ but rather for ‘Alien Form of Life’. Remember that it is by sharing a form of life that different kinds of hominids can become speaking ‘fellow-creatures’ that humans can understand (and that can understand humans).

On closer investigation, the assumed self-evident assumption of Homo sapiens unique competence of language turned out to be an illusion. The results of this canonical empirical (eighteen-year long) experiment are shattering. This empirical experiment became a demonstration of the philosophical usefulness of this outlook. The experiment has important implications when, for example, performing conceptual investigations in ordinary language. Presently, however, there is an almost ineradicably prejudice concerning the existence (and increasing amounts) of language-competent hominids. For example, we find this prejudice in modern investigations called comparative psychology. Here one takes for granted the assumed grand hidden distinction between humans and other kinds of hominids (and animals in general). We have also other examples.

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5 See the canonical argument by Savage-Rumbaugh & al (1993). This crucial experiment does not belong to ‘science fiction’. Instead, it is today a corroborated genuine empirical experiment. It is necessary requirement when answering the question if one can read words and expressions in Wittgenstein’s post-1936 texts as being post-Wittgensteinian in nature.


7 See Wittgenstein 1953, 223

8 Segerdahl, in a private letter to me, emphasized that he in the original manuscript of the book (Kanzi’s Primal Language 2005) used the expression ‘person’ instead of ‘fellow-creature’. The former reading was one of the changes requested by one referee who read the manuscript on behalf of the publisher. Segerdahl, Fields, and Savage-Rumbaugh, had then to change the word ‘animal’, originally used in the manuscript, to ‘fellow-creature’ as requested by the publishing company.
of this distinction in science (for example, in psychology, social psychology, cognitive linguistics, and cognitive science).

This assumed distinction is what we are to dislodge. The question is not whether we can teach hominids language or if they can learn it. They are not copying us. Instead, the question is if we can help them become beings, in which language is as deeply entrenched as it is in us humans. ‘Becoming someone’ is more profound than ‘learning something’. Different kinds of hominids become sufficiently like us humans to be co-inhabitants in language. Setting out with bi-species cultural Pan/Homo language-competence, I began in 2004 reading Wittgenstein’s terminology in the post-1936 manuscripts as ‘post-Wittgensteinian’ conceptual (philosophical) writings.\textsuperscript{10}

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I have gradually been formulating the chapters of the present manuscript for a number of years. I had to change my position a number of times. Finally, the result is a manuscript having the title: \textit{Wittgenstein’s Paradise: Language Games with Other Animals}. Here I am reading Wittgenstein’s post-1936 comments on ‘language’ when not recognising the Pan/Homo dichotomy. Instead, I turn the other way around and state that we, since the canonical experiment in 1993, have to read Wittgenstein’s post-1936 comments on communicative ‘language’, in addition to humans, applicable also to different kinds of hominid species.\textsuperscript{11} It is then important that we (humans) have to leave the sceptical attitude behind whether different kinds of hominids, using every-day human language, actually cross-culturally communicate with humans.

Hominids, before a certain age, can spontaneously acquire competence to use a portable and interactive keyboard called a \textit{lexigram}.\textsuperscript{12} It is today an empirical fact that hominids spontaneously acquire interactive competence to use a lexigram by which they can communicate with humans. This is no longer an open

\textsuperscript{9} See The Ethics Blog, Uppsala Universitet, by Per Segerdahl that we find in http://ethicsblog.crb.uu.se/2012/02/17/apes-t

\textsuperscript{10} Other important philosophers that we perhaps can attempt to read and evaluate according to the post-1993 outlook are, for example, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, and Bergson.

\textsuperscript{11} In fact, communicative ‘language’, depending what kind of species we are dealing with, can in principle, also belong to other kinds of animals (e.g. dolphins, whales) than humans and hominids.

\textsuperscript{12} For a description of a lexigram and the way to use it when communicating with Hominids, see http://www.greatapetrust.org/science/history
question.\textsuperscript{13} Then it is, however, important to understand that this competence is not something we need empirically to prove. The experiment itself does not focus on the truly revolutionary outlook. We have to understand that \emph{humans and hominids spontaneously can share language with another} (whereas we find the empiric ‘canonical’ experiment verifying this to be the case to be a scientific second-language embedded in first verbal language). Then we realize that we always have aspects of cross-cultural language at our disposal but that we, before 1993, were not aware of this outlook. In this investigation, we set out with this outlook. This means that when we after 1993 read Wittgensteins post-1936 texts we understand them \emph{without changing them in any way}. We have then to understand ‘language’ (and other words and expressions of Wittgenstein’s post-1936 terminology) having another meaning.

I now want to provide two points concerning Wittgenstein’s post-1936 use of language when read according to the 1993 outlook of Savage-Rumbaugh & al. There are two ways to read Wittgenstein’s post-1936 texts. We can read them as if Wittgenstein \emph{already} in 1936 has what I call \emph{inseparable outlook}.\textsuperscript{14} This reading is only partially correct. Let me (informally) explain this point. Indeed, we can read Wittgenstein as having this (cultural) outlook, but he does not explicitly describe this in his investigations. He mentions, however, this clearly as a possibility in his post-1936 writings.\textsuperscript{15} However, it is still not a corroborated empirical (scientific) fact in 1936. He (and the rest of humans) is simply not aware at this time of the corroborated \emph{factual} outlook. It is crucially important that we understand this correctly.

It is important to understand what we mean by ‘inseparable’. It incorporates \emph{Pan/Homo} languacultural aspects. This makes communication possible. I do not claim that Wittgenstein, since it was not empirically corroborated before 1993 to be a fact, already in 1936 had empirical (and corroborated) inseparable outlook concerning \emph{Pan/Homo} communication. Such a claim is of course absurd since, due to the canonical experiment by Savage-

\textsuperscript{13} See Segerdahl, Fields, and Savage-Rumbaugh 2005, 6, 67-68, 215-218, 221. Note that this has nothing to do with Chomsky’s separable (and theoretical) Language Acquisition Device (LAD).

\textsuperscript{14} When we only regard \emph{humans} to have communicative capability, we either have separable (scientific) or non-separable (Hacker) views. These are presently the common, but mistaken, views. However, when we have cross-cultural kind of \emph{Pan/Homo} communication we have what I call inseparable outlook.

\textsuperscript{15} Wittgenstein mentions this possibility on a number of places. See, for example, ‘It is sometimes said that animals do not talk. And this means: “they do not think, and that is why they do not talk.” But, - they simply do not talk. Or to put it better: they do not use language - if we except the most primitive forms of language. – Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing’, Wittgenstein 1953, §25.
Rumbaugh & al., one cannot establish before 1993 that it is an empirical fact. Of course, it would be great to be able, somehow, to establish that Wittgenstein already in 1936 could entertain corroborated inseparable outlook. However, such a conclusion is mistaken. One cannot extract evidence for this from his post-1936 manuscripts (although, as we shall see, there are formulations in his texts that reminds very much of this position) to make an empirical claim. **However, the crucial thing is the realization that empirical evidence for cross-cultural Pan/Homo language-competence was not existent in 1936.**

Next, we need a few words concerning the way we use ‘culture’. We are to read Wittgenstein so that everything he says in his post-1936 texts is in accordance with the post-1993 experimental outlook by Savage-Rumbaugh & al., and Segerdahl, Fields, and Savage-Rumbaugh’s comments in 2005. Then we must read Wittgensteins comments on culture setting out with animal culture originally formulated in 1942 by Kinji Imanishi (1902-1992). This new research concerning Wittgenstein then develops Charles Darwin’s revolution in biology further by exploiting the extent to which culture is one of our ‘natural’ possessions – one that humans share with many other animal species. We can indeed learn more about ourselves as cultural beings by studying animals.

We set out with this outlook. However, Wittgenstein himself never mentions anything of this cultural outlook in his published texts. We nevertheless, after 1993, take this reading as being correct. Since 1993, we require animal culture when reading Wittgensteins writings. This is how we presently are to read his post-1936 manuscripts. We do it despite that one can find comments in Wittgenstein’s post-1936 texts that one easily can read as providing indication about inseparable facts. However, as I said, it requires post-1993 outlook of animal culture by Imanishi (1942), and common animal language, the idea formulated by Segerdahl, Fields, and Savage-Rumbaugh (2005), to do this. The latter ones call animal language for primal language. Segerdahl has later replaced the expression ‘animal culture’ by ‘primary culture’. To use the expression ‘primal language’ is to use it as inseparable cultural matrix determining specific

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16 ‘And is there not something that could be called culture, although it is of course different from human culture’, Imanishi, K., Seibutsu no Sekai (A Japanese View of Nature. The World of Living Things) 2002 (first published in Japan in 1942), 81. See also Itani, J., The Evolution of Primal Social Structures 1985, Man 20: 593-611.

17 See, for example, Wittgenstein 1953, §25.


languages in everyday life.\textsuperscript{20} We are then, with inseparable ‘conceptual glasses’, reading post-1993 meanings of words and expressions occurring in Wittgenstein’s post-1936 manuscripts. We do it by reading them as dealing with aspects of primal language and different conceptual (philosophical) investigations.

The inseparable way of reading Wittgenstein’s post-1936 writings concerning aspects of language I call \textit{languacultural} reading.\textsuperscript{21} We have then a complex and inseparable mixture of \textit{culture}, \textit{biology}, and \textit{language}. Biology and language are subordinate to culture. Therefore, I shall concentrate on culture. By culture we mean something else than we usually assume in purely human circumstances. Following Imanishi, we take culture to be inseparable primary (human and animal) culture. Culture is \textit{not} only of human competence, as we usually assume, for example, in present investigations in higher-level (social-scientific) social anthropology as well as (humanistic) cultural anthropology. Presently both scientists and humanistic scholars cannot think publicly without activating the separable quality they share with colleagues, while forgetting our common primary culture. Separable scientific (empirical) and scholastic (humanistic) views concerning meaning of language aspects are not correct here. We have to recognise that humans and different kinds of hominids (and perhaps other animals) have competence of primary culture and can be part of cross-cultural communicative language. This is why we by culture mean primary (animal) culture (and here we regard humans as animals). Since primal language is an aspect of primary culture, we can say that we presently always provide post-1993 languacultural readings concerning language.

We must, presently, read Wittgenstein’s post-1936 texts languaculturally. This reading will in turn result in different outlooks in scientific, humanistic and, surprisingly enough, also in philosophical practices. As far as ordinary language is concerned this outlook makes the usual \textit{scientific} (e.g. Skinner, Chomsky) or \textit{humanistic} (e.g. Baker & Hackers non-separable reading of post-1936 Wittgenstein) way of reading language incomplete and redundant. We find that many well-known philosophers are reading post-1936 Wittgenstein as a hero in a

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\begin{enumerate}
\item We do not ‘[…] merely see language as embedded in culture, but identify language – as it is originally acquired during what Bruner called “immaturity” – with the broader matrix of everyday life. When the cultural matrix – the primal language – is in place, it is possible to learn a second language, a foreign language, a specific language, without developing the entire matrix again’, Segerdahl, Fields, and Savage-Rumbaugh 2005, 8. See also 25, 59, and 79.
\item We find the expression ‘languaculture’ already used in assumed separable/non-separable circumstances in the literature, but here I use languaculture in \textit{inseparable} circumstances.
\end{enumerate}
humanistic project. I am claiming that Wittgenstein was not involved in a scientific as well as humanistic project. I shall argue that all his post-1936 writings on language – since the empirical breakthrough by Savage-Rumbaugh & al in 1993 – presently must be read languaculturally.

Due to languacultural outlook, I am dislodging Wittgenstein both from scientific as well as humanistic strife. Following Segerdahl, Fields, and Savage-Rumbaugh, I give examples of hominids, consisting of bonobos, chimpanzees, orangutans, and gorillas exhibiting complex languacultural communicative dialogues with humans. We know that, due to the ‘plasticity’ of their brain, young bonobos can engage in complex languacultural dialogues (on the level of roughly 2½-year-old human children) with humans.

I claim that if Wittgenstein had been aware of Pan/Homo dialogues, he would accept them as good examples concerning competence of language, despite that they are not completely human according to humanistic ideals, and hominids do not completely master human language. However, when saying this, we have to be careful since it is important to be aware that not even an educated human can claim to master a language completely. Such a claim of complete competence amounts to nonsense. A human being does not have to appreciate, for example, writers, poets, historians, mathematicians, psychologists, natural- and social-scientists, or have the possibility of doing so when becoming older, in order to be a species that can talk and answer when spoken to - a species that has language.

Advocates for the humanistic reading are, for example, such otherwise diverse and famous philosophers as Peter Winch, G.E.M. Anscombe, Anthony Kenny, Gordon Baker, G. H. von Wright, Brian McGuinness, Cora Diamond, Stanley Cavell, and, last but not least, Peter Hacker. See the articles in ‘On Wittgenstein’ in D. X. Phillips, ed., Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 24, No.3, April 2001, 89-184. Note that this position is not entirely correct as far as the reading by Hacker is concerned. In an article, published in 2010, Hacker recognizes, besides the competence of humans, in addition also ‘[…] the marginal exception of chimpanzees’, Hacker 2010, 97. However, here Hacker is mistaken in that Kanzi, the hominid, who took part in the experiment by Savage-Rumbaugh & al, is a bonobo (Pan paniscus) and not a chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes). A bonobo (1) looks differently, hunts differently, and (2) is genetically distinct from a chimpanzee, see Surbekk and Hohmann 2008. Note also that Hacker, in the same article, acknowledges Chomsky’s ‘innate’ knowledge of language, see Hacker 2010, 97. However, be aware that Chomsky, in numerous previous publications, is not acknowledging hominids as having language. In this respect, we note that Hacker (with some reservations) and Chomsky have the same view.

It is in principle the same with other kinds of hominids although the time-span of languacultural enculturation is different. Note that the ‘window of opportunity’ to acquire competence of language closes for humans and different hominids at different ages. See Savage-Rumbaugh, Kanzi Wamba, Panbanisha Wamba & Nyota Wamba, ‘Welfare of Apes in Capture Environments. Comments On, and By, a Specific Group of Apes’, Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science 10(1), 2007, 7-19.
It is important to realize, when we with languacultural post-1993 ‘conceptual glasses’ are reading Wittgenstein’s post-1936 terminological expressions and words like ‘language’, ‘language-game’, etc., that we are not in any way allowed to change the content of his writings. It is important that we read them as we encounter them, in order to be able to show that we can read Wittgenstein’s post-1936 expressions with languacultural outlook. To do this, we are carefully reading his post-1936 words and expressions conceptually. Note that I do not say that we are to interpret his texts. The reason is that to be able to interpret them presupposes that we already understand what culture and language are. If this were the case then we should be able to define both culture and language, but culture and language are indefinable due to ongoing development (evolution) of the way of life. We then require formulation of the idea concerning dynamic primary culture and dynamic primal language. Primary culture and primal language relates closely to Wittgenstein’s post-1936 expression form of life. Primary cultures and primal language have numerous forms of life. There are then numerous forms of culture and language. Therefore, to request a unique single everlasting definition of primary culture and primal language amounts to pure nonsense. We are not attempting to establish (theoretically) such an everlasting (a priori) definition. Attempting to theoretically define culture and language is to perform a vicious circle.

By culture and language, we mean primary culture and primal language. It is not surprising to find that we presently have to read Wittgenstein’s post-1936 terminology with post-1993 sense. I am then reading Wittgenstein’s (post-1936) comments on aspects of language and philosophy with languacultural outlook. This outlook turns out to be of another kind than we usually assume to be the case. When languaculturally read, we read Wittgensteins post-1936

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24 This point has already been emphasized by Johannesen (in non-separable circumstances), when he says that we ‘[…] need to highlight the difference between being a reader of Wittgenstein and being an interpreter of him’, Johannesen 2008, 6.

25 See Segerdahl, Fields, and Savage-Rumbaugh 2005, 11-12. As non-separably emphasized by Hertzberg, ‘[…] wanting to think about language in relation to biological evolution is misconceived to begin with, whether one wishes to show that language is an outcome of evolution, or that evolution could not possible account for it’, Hertzberg 1994, 81. There have been different interpretations of what ‘form of life’ amounts to. This reminds us of Eduard Sapir’s mistaken formulation of anthropocentric (scientific/humanistic) ‘form of life’. As we shall see below in the book, a ‘form of life’ is languaculturally inseparable. It is neither (separably) scientific nor is it (non-separably) humanistic. In this respect, it reminds of J.F.M. Hunters thought provoking scientific but non-separable (human) position. He argues for the intimate (but restricted ‘participatory’) relation between man’s use of language and his biological nature. See J. F. M. Hunter ‘“Form of Life” in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations’, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4, Oct. 1968, 233-243.
writings, so that they mean something conceptually different with concepts like ‘culture’, ‘biology’, ‘language’, ‘language-game’ and ‘form of life’, than realized by current non-separable commentators and readers of his texts. We disregard any of the assumed Wittgensteinian post-1936 humanistic conceptions of language by showing an increasing amount of humans and hominids that we, after 1993, recognise to have acquired languacultural competence.

When reading post-1936 Wittgenstein with non-separable humanistic ‘conceptual spectacles’, one reads of human builders and primitive people, but when one post-1993, with languacultural ‘conceptual spectacles’, is reading these manuscripts, one, besides humans, also have to include hominids, i.e., bonobos (Kanzi & al.), chimpanzees (Panzee), orangutans (Allie, Popi), and gorillas (Koko). Despite this, one can notice that this latter post-1993 languacultural reading of Wittgenstein’s terminology is completely in agreement with the formulations in his post-1936 philosophical investigations. We can then attempt to formulate methodologically, for example, a languaculturally conceptual outlook in cultural psychology.

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The present investigations differ from humanistic interpretations of post-1936 Wittgenstein by openly saying this - by daring to say that he is not a humanistic hero that is emphasizing the uniquely human. To assume that we can say that he is emphasizing only the human aspect amounts after 1993 to a conceptual illusion. We are dislodging Wittgenstein’s post-1936 philosophical writings from the present tendency to anthropocentrically idealize (pictures of) human beings. This has extremely important consequences concerning humans as well as different kinds of hominids. It means to recognize, for example, that we have languaculturally inseparable concepts of ‘anthropology’, ‘primatology’, and ‘psychology’. As ordinary anthropologists by definition are studying only

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26 Interestingly enough, we find that Wittgenstein already in the Brown Book (1935) attempted to emphasize the important point with culture and language but only in human contexts, see Wittgenstein 1958/1969, 134-135. Other piece of texts where he is partly taking the human view of culture is the selection of manuscripts called Vermischte Bemerkungen/Culture and Value (1998).


28 According to Wittgenstein, ‘[…] the word “methodology” has a double meaning. Not only a physical investigation, but also a conceptual one, can be called “methodological investigations”’, Wittgenstein 1953, 225.

29 For an attempt to languaculturally read cultural psychology, see Gefwert, Christoffer, ‘Bruner’s Cultural Psychology: Languacultural Reading’, in Gefwert and Lagerspetz (eds.), Wittgenstein
humans, we regard Wittgenstein’s conceptual post-1936 methods, when languaculturally read, also open to move towards hominids (and other animals). Then we may ask, for example, if one can regard mammals, like different kind of hominids, elephants, and dolphins, as persons. This question is presently debated intensely. However, the languacultural answer to this question is that this question is not important as such. As the primatologist Barbara J. King says, ‘[…] more critical than deciding whether to consider them persons, we need to see their relational selves as they are and act on that vision’. This gives raise to inseparable anthropological, primatological, and psychological outlooks. By languaculturally anthropological outlook, we do not mean non-separable humanistic perspective on primal language. Neither do we mean non-separable humanistic perspective on primal language in primatological investigations. We are not sliding either to Scylla of separable human scientific (realistic/anti-realistic) view or Charybdis of humanistic (non-separable) view. Instead, having inseparable languacultural outlook, we are, like Ulysses, on a lifelong voyage on ‘the sea of language’, sailing free of all these kinds of interpretations. Having languacultural outlook, we regard living beings as actors in time. They are beings whose acts, customs, decisions, etc., may change the way they live. We can then say that cultural understanding is cultural transformation. This involves heightened awareness of the post-1993 requirement of faithfulness to languaculturally-blended practices.

Cultivation transforms humans and hominids way of being humans and hominids. Primary culture makes them pregnant with primal language. When becoming increasingly acquainted with words and expressions primal language is growing in humans and hominids. This important point means that humans and different kinds of hominids become languaculturally-transformed

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and Philosophical Psychology: Essays in Honour of Lars Hertzberg, Uppsala Philosophical Studies 55 (2009), Uppsala Universitet.

30 I am aware that ordinary anthropologists could say that their investigations are not ‘based’ at all on the Pan/Homo dichotomy because they do not treat it in the first place. Indeed, one can, claim that there are large anthropological areas where this question does not arise at all. This is correct. However, this does not mean that one in such cases somehow is escaping languacultural thought.


32 Note that languacultural outlook of anthropology is quite close to the view of Bronislaw Malinowski when he writes that ‘I submit that the linguistics of the future, especially as regards the science of meaning, will become the study of language in the context of culture’, Malinowski, B., A Scientific Theory of Culture, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press (1944), 5.
individuals. When transformed they are *enculturated.* That is, hominids who understand humans are transformed hominids, and humans who understand hominids are transformed humans. We have to realize that only if young enough humans and hominids allow themselves to change due to adoption of common primary culture can one languaculturally understand common aspects. They are transformed individuals. However, as I said above, it is extremely important to be aware that languacultural methodological outlook has only been possible since 1993.

The result is that different aspects of post-1993 outlook have different important consequences concerning the way we read Wittgenstein’s post-1936 writings concerning language and conceptual (philosophical) investigations. We humans are reading his (philosophical) publications with languacultural sense. Presently, only humans can *read* written second-language texts. When performing conceptual (philosophical) investigations with words and expressions of primal language we *cannot* separably (realistically/anti-realistically) talk of *a priori* correct (true) formal second-languages used as ‘tools’ (as logical empiricists did) in conceptual (philosophical) investigations. Humans *already* have competence to use primal language in second-language practices. Transformed humans (and in principle also hominids) are neither separable *human* (realistic/anti-realistic) ‘observers’ nor restrictive non-separable *human* ‘participators’. Instead, we (humans and hominids) languaculturally (and inseparably) participate in different forms of life. We realize that from 1993 onwards we should languaculturally read the terminology of post-1936 Wittgenstein as attacking rationalism about current rationalism that misrationalises it.

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When Wittgenstein, in 1936, in Skjolden, Norway, began writing the first 188 paragraphs of what was to become the first part of *Philosophical Investigations,* we should, today (after 1993), read every manuscript with languacultural outlook. In this book, I shall attempt to show how we are to read different aspects with this outlook. I am in this book languaculturally clarifying and describing what

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33 Segerdahl shows what enculturation amounts to (since 1993) in ‘The Difficulty of Acknowledging our Primary Culture, in Forsberg and Jansson (eds.), *Acknowledging Stanley Cavell,* Uppsala Philosophical Studies 56 (2009), 21-38.
35 Note that this is *not* to say that *Bonobos* cannot bi-culturally, using a lexigram, engage in primitive *verbal* second-languages, for example, American Sign Language.
36 I am grateful of this formulation to Professor Juliet Floyd who in 2007 read an early manuscript of mine and suggested valuable comments on it in a letter.
Wittgenstein’s post-1936 writings mean, when taking the post-1993 ‘hurly-burly’ of primary culture, biology, and language, into account, for example, in his terminology, as analogous and intertwined ‘language-games’, ‘family-resemblances’, and ‘forms of life’.

Wittgenstein began his work in the autumn of 1936 when formulating the first manuscript of *Philosophical Investigations*, which we, post-1993, are reading as being concerned with acquisition of languacultural aspects. This inseparable languacultural reading has big implications concerning certain philosophical problems that we are to investigate. For example, we are in this book languaculturally investigating (philosophical) topics, like (1) universal scepticism, (2) philosophical certainty, and (3) senselessness of ‘private language’. All have different outlook than presently assumed in separable/non-separable investigations. The investigations that we languaculturally perform have anthropomorphomic outlook. Furthermore, we do not exclude second-languages dealing with, for example, aspects of (written, grammatical) mother tongues, foreign natural languages, mathematical and logical calculations, as well as psychological investigations, from languacultural reading.

The result is that one after 1993 is to read post-1936 Wittgenstein with (to a large extent unknown) languacultural outlook. By this reading, I am then, independently of Wittgenstein, extending the way one presently is to read the meaning of *Philosophical Investigations*. The geniality of Wittgenstein’s post-1936 formulations is that they are genuinely valid statements when we read them with languacultural sense. I am then providing a novel reading of post-1936 Wittgenstein. We are languaculturally reading his *Philosophical Investigations* (and later texts), but not as we presently are assumed to read them, i.e. as different kinds of non-separable humanistic readings.

Wittgenstein uses the term *paradigm* in *Philosophical Investigations*. Note that recognising languacultural acquaintance is not to adopt a scientific paradigm in Kuhn’s sense. It does not concern any (scientific) attempt to perform second-language (semantical) formulation of linguistic change. Thus, one cannot languaculturally formulate, for example, Wittgensteins concept of ‘paradigm’ as a second-language (set-theoretic) methodological formalization as Stegmüller is advocating for Kuhn’s paradigms. On the contrary, to read aspects of language

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38 See Venturinha 2010, 143ff.
with languacultural ‘conceptual glasses’ is to turn around 180 degrees and provide inseparable Wittgensteinian methodological (philosophical) conceptual readings. One has to understand such readings by languacultural *pincer movements* in Winch terminology. The results are what Wittgenstein called *certain* and belong to forms of life. The aim with this book is to help the reader to languaculturally read Wittgenstein’s post-1936 books and texts. I claim that when we look carefully enough we should, without any changes to the textual paragraphs occurring in Wittgenstein’s different manuscripts, be able to read his post-1936 terminology with languacultural ‘conceptual glasses’.

It is pity that Wittgenstein never personally experienced *Pan/Homo* cross-cultural communication. Today one can say that humans and the rest of the hominids, indeed, are living on a common ‘planet of the apes’. However, we are actually living on *Gaia*, the ‘planet of life’, exhibiting inseparable and common languacultural forms of life. Wittgenstein would surely have appreciated this way of characterizing aspects of life. Unfortunately, he died long before 1993 when Savage-Rumbaugh & al., for the first time, *empirically* proved cross-cultural *Pan/Homo* communication to be a fact. This means that Wittgenstein’s post-1936 terminology concerning language, since inauguration of inseparable formulations in 1993, must be languaculturally read. Both humans and different kinds of hominids become transformed species when they spontaneously become acquainted with languacultural life.

This is in agreement with Wittgenstein’s requirement of methodological conceptual (philosophical) investigations. We use *Philosophical Investigations* (and the later manuscripts) without changing his terminology when performing languacultural investigations. It is with languacultural outlook that we presently have to read Wittgenstein’s post-1936 writings. When formulating this idea it amounts to investigations having post-1993 sense. Unfortunately, Wittgenstein prematurely, having stayed for a time in von Wrights house, had to end his important conceptual investigations, when he, due to cancer, 29th of April 1951, died in Dr. Bevan’s house in Cambridge, England.

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43 I am here using Wittgenstein’s version of ‘certainty’ originating from the last one and a half years of his life, when he reacted to two articles by G.E. Moore, that we find in his manuscripts published as the book *On Certainty*. 