Confusion as a necessity of moral reflection and action

Introduction and background:

This text began with the intention of comprising a first draft of chapter three of my thesis, which has the title “confusion and clarity”. In the two chapters which will hopefully precede the thoughts presented in this text I discuss how we might understand the relevance of other human beings in our lives, what it might mean to hide away from others, and what it might mean to know the self or be self-deceived.

The aim of the current paper is to examine the role of uncertainty and confusion in life and the need to include these elements in our conception of morality. The main critique is that morality is often perceived, at least within philosophical circles, as if it were a dispute about which choice one should make. I try to show how confusion and clarity are two sides of the same coin, namely the meaning we find and attribute to circumstance, choices, thoughts, and actions in our lives.

1. Confusion and the desire to be rid of confusion

Metaphorically speaking we can imagine confusion in our lives as a fog or mist settling all around us. We become blind to our surroundings and must edge our way forward, unsure at every step. We may risk walking, quickly or slowly, or we may want to stay and wait out the worst. Whatever the case may be, there is something blocking us, making us slow down or even stop completely. An extreme example of this is Shakespeare's portrayal of King Lear who fails to see the sincere love of his youngest daughter Cordelia and for that reason divides the kingdom between his two remaining daughters Goneril and Regan, who then betray him. (King Lear, William Shakespeare) Later we learn that Lear becomes mad and in the end dies, all because he wanted his daughters to prove how much they loved him, neither recognising nor wanting the humble and honest love which Cordelia tried to show him. This literary example shows how life even for a king can be warped into misunderstanding and confusion, yet this is only one way of looking at confusion. There is a myriad of examples from which one might choose to touch upon the subject of confusion, ranging from the
most difficult of mental disorders, to everyday situations as, for example, not wanting to face a colleague at work. A student deciding on his or her future might feel confusion, or someone breaking up with their partner, or someone attempting to write a novel or an essay might conduce such a state of being. In all these cases, there are many variations and degrees of descriptions that might be given in order to explain the reasons for being uncertain or in doubt. Lear was after all blinded both by his station in life and by his misconception of love, but a student wanting to choose the right path might not be confused in the way Lear was, simply unsure about which choice to make. In fact, every example seems to require its own description and explanation to be fully understood. Why then unite all these under the concept of confusion? This is, however, not the aim of this paper. The examples are merely given in an attempt to illustrate that states of confusion, though varied in many ways, seem to be understandable descriptions of conditions common to all human beings.

Coupled with the idea of things not always being clear, there also seems to be a wish for things to become clear. Naturally it might be said that in some cases people might prefer confusion or chaos, as for instance and artist who is looking for inspiration. Yet in general terms it could be said that people do not actively look for confusion, rather they look for and try and reach clarity in their lives and in themselves. In philosophy, dating back to Plato or possibly even earlier, there has been a wish to clarify the world and to be able to avoid confusion all together. In his famous cave allegory in *The Republic* Plato portrays, though a dialogue between Glaucon and Socrates, the world as one of shadows and illusion. (*The Republic*, book 7) Reality it seems lies somewhere else and the one we perceive is only a mimicry of that other, higher and more pure, reality. Plato's conception of the world seems to have been a hierarchical one, where the good lies at the top of its structure. Intellectual and moral developmental must, therefore, strive towards this ultimate goal, towards the good. Being the light of the world “the good” acts, however, not only as the highest goal in life, but it is also that which gives shape and meaning to all else in the world. “The good” might then be seen as synonymous or at least comparable with the idea of a god, since it acts as the source of everything in the world. In the dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon, there can clearly be discerned the idea that humankind should strive upwards, to the good, and away from all illusion:

This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed.
whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

I agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.

Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted. (The Republic, book 7)

Plato writes: “[...]in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all[...]” and is “[...] the universal author of all things beautiful and right[...]”, which seems to suggest that episteme, or knowledge, cannot be understood separate from “the good”, since “the good” gives meaning to all else. This is, nevertheless, only one reading and understanding of Plato's thoughts, yet the representation appears to touch upon an element that is present in Plato's writing, in accordance with the excerpt given. Similarly there is another connection between “the good” and “knowledge” which presents itself in the platonic approach and that is that Plato advocates the idea that knowledge of “the good” is in many ways synonymous with doing the good. In other words; one that knows the good, strives to the good. This connection might not be attributable to Plato himself, yet it is a clear line of thought within platonic philosophy. The basis for this assumption can be seen in Protagoras, where we find the following:

Then if, I proceeded, the pleasant is good, no one who has knowledge or thought of other actions as better than those he is doing, and as possible, will do as he proposes if he is free to do the better ones; and this yielding to oneself is nothing but ignorance, and mastery of oneself is as certainly wisdom.

They all agree.

Well then, by ignorance do you mean having a false opinion and being deceived about matters of importance?

They all agreed to this also.

Then surely, I went on, no one willingly goes after evil or what he thinks to be evil; it is not in human nature, apparently, to do so—to wish to go after what one thinks to be evil in preference to the good; and when compelled to choose one of two evils, nobody will
choose the greater when he may the lesser. (*Protagoras*, 358c-d)

And also in *Meno* a similar though is presented:

Soc. Then is there anyone who wishes to be miserable an ill-starred?
Men. I do not suppose there is Socrates.
Soc. No one, then, Meno, desires evil, if no one desires to be such an one: for what is miserable but desiring evil and obtaining it?
Men. It seems that what you say is true, Socrates, and that nobody desires evil.
Soc. Well now, you were saying a moment ago that virtue is the desire and ability for good?
Men. Yes, I was.
Soc. One part of the statement-the desire-belongs to our common nature, and in this respect one man is no better than another?
Men. Apparently.
Soc. But it is plain that if one man is no better then another in this, he must be superior in ability.
Men. Certainly
Soc. Then virtue, it seems by your account, is the ability to procure goods.
Men. I entirely agree, Socrates, with the view which you now take of the matter. (*Meno* 78a-b)

In both *Protagoras* and *Meno* there is a clear account of “the good” as something connected with knowledge, and further that no one being of rational mind would set as their goal anything other then the good. To act badly or of ill intent seems, therefore, not only to be a moral failing, it is a cognitive failure. A failure to realise or comprehend what is good. This representation of the good, of virtues, and of the goals of humankind demonstrates that according to the platonic perspective “purity of heart”, to borrow a phrase from Kierkegaard, or moral assuredness can be acquired by cognitive means. This may naturally be seen as an all too crude description of platonic ethics, since there is the question of the role that both actions and virtues have in achieving the good, also there is the problem of *Akrasia*, the weakness of will in the knowledge of what is good. Yet it is not the aim of this text to give a concise description of Plato's works, simply to show a tendency in platonic philosophy to view the world in extremes, as good versus evil, and subsequently to see humankind in need of ridding itself of all the confusion and illusion of “ordinary” existence.

Thus far it has been stated that confusion seems to be part of life and acts as a meaningful description in different situations. It has also been revealed that according to platonic thought
humankind exists in a kind of illusory state of existence or at least on a lower level of understanding than is to be desired. Returning to the image, given at the start of this paper, of confusion as a fog enveloping our lives and clouding our way, one might say that the platonic view of confusion is that this is a result of ignorance, a cognitive misconception. There is, therefore, a cure, a way out of confusion which can be achieved through rational means. This view has been presented in the hope of illustrating a tendency to view confusion as something unwanted and possibly even malicious in human life. The predisposition is, however, not exclusively a philosophical one, for it can also be seen in much of everyday life, as for example, in the often debated problem of knowing the self and of becoming clear about one's wants and desires in life.¹ There is, consequently, a question to be raised in connection with confusion and that is: Is confusion truly an anomaly, a defect of an otherwise perfect and unhindered experience of reality and life? Imagine life without confusion, without a fog. A clear and open landscape in which we are free to see all, our sight unencumbered by bad weather. Humanity free from confusion, doubt, and indecision. Is this a meaningful description of our lives and is it something we ought to strive towards? And is knowledge really synonymous with morality in this way?²

2. An end to confusion?

To explore possible answers to the question of whether or not confusion might be desirable, there is good reason to turn to an excerpt from Letters to a young poet, wherein the correspondences between Rainer Maria Rilke and a young man named Franz Xaver Kappus, are presented. The reason for focusing on this part of Rilke's letters is that it might elucidate the following proposition being made in this text that; maybe confusion is not only the absence of clarity, but also the attempt to become clear, and maybe clarity is not the absence of confusion, but sometimes the end of the road of confusion. Rilke writes:

We have no reason to harbour any mistrust against our world, for it is not against us. If it has terrors, they are our terrors; if it has abysses, these abysses belong to us; if there are dangers, we must try to love them. [...]Perhaps all the dragons of our lives are princesses who are only waiting to see us act, just once, with beauty and courage. Perhaps everything that frightens us is, in its deepest essence, something helpless that wants our love.⁴ (Letters to a young poet, Rainer Maria Rilke, p. 91-92.)

¹ For a more extensive discussion about understanding the self, self-awareness, and self-deception, see chapter two.
² Synonymous in the sense that moral problems might be resolved through purely cognitive means, through acquiring more knowledge.
What is most striking in the quotation is Rilke's contradictory tone. He says that the terrors and abysses that we experience in life are our own and not of the world, yet he also speaks of a world filled with dangers, dragons and things that frighten us. Rilke might possibly be referring to obstacles in life and the reason he uses terms such as “dragons” or “dangers” is simply because of our own “terror” in facing those obstacles. This would mean that he sees the world as split into two, there is the world, which is neutral, and then there is our perception of the world. We might feel scared or even terrified, yet the terror comes from us not from the world. That is why Rilke writes: “We have no reason to harbour any mistrust against our world[...]”. This description might be complete were it not for the fact that Rilke also speaks of love; he remarks that something that frightens us is “[...]in its deepest essence, something helpless that wants our love.”. This complicates the clear-cut image of the world as separate from us and our terrors and frights as subjective experiences of a neutral world, since it suggests there is a connection between the world and the self, other than “mere” perception. Naturally, one might suppose that Rilke is propounding the view that the terrors we experience in life are part of us and should be met with love, in other words we should be kind with our own fears, we should love and help ourselves deal with our fears. Yet it is also possible that Rilke is hinting at an existential or spiritual element of our fears and of the world. Why else does he write: “Perhaps all the dragons of our lives are princesses who are only waiting to see us act, just once, with beauty and courage.”, if not to say that the world wants to help, wants to force us to act and develop. In light of the quotation given it is, subsequently, possible to discern at least four aspects of Rilke's view of the world. Firstly: difficulties appear in order to change us, secondly: we are frightened of these changes and see them as a threat, thirdly: we should try and meet these obstacles and changes in life with love, and lastly: there is an existential element to our connection with the world, the world cares about us.

Directly after the passage quoted, Rilke writes the following:

So you mustn't be frightened, dear MR. Kappus, if a sadness rises in front of you, larger than any you have ever seen; if an anxiety, like light and cloud-shadows, move over your hands and over everything you do. You must realize that something is happening to you, that life has not forgotten you, that it holds you in its hand and will not let you fall. Why do you want to shut out of your life any uneasiness, any misery, any depression, since after all you don't know what work these conditions are doing inside you? (Letters to a young poet, Rainer Maria Rilke, p. 92-93.)

Here we also find the notion that the troubles we face in our lives are important and not unwanted.
and illusory states of being. If we avoid the metaphysical aspect that may or may not be part of Rilke's perspective, which appears to be present when he writes “[...]life has not forgotten you[...]” and “[...]it holds you in its hand and will not let you fall[...]”, there is still a very important and clear thought presented here. That is that we should not assume to know what place or meaning uneasiness, misery, or depression have in our lives. In other words; is it wise to want to be rid of all troubles and confusion, when we “[...]don't know what work these conditions are doing inside[...]” us?

At the heart of this question lies the idea of meaning in our lives. Not “the meaning of life” but the meaning we attribute circumstances, instances, changes, developments, regressions, depressions, doubts etc. in our lives and in ourselves. Description and understanding seem in many ways to be central elements in judging what is meaningful in life. This also includes perspectives of time, when one looks and when one judges or describes. Is it in the moment of doubt and confusion or is it done in retrospect, or is it perhaps a combination of having done both? The student who chooses wisely might in retrospect see it as having been a good choice, another might suddenly realise they chose the wrong path, the wrong subject. In each case the student, upon evaluating their situation and reaching a conclusion about it having been a good or bad choice, is judging and describing their own lives. What seems meaningful to one might not be so for another and the difference involves elements ranging from the individuals capability to understand themselves and their situation, to how others perceive them and their actions. The point is that we may look back upon troubled times and make sense of them and although we at the time were in doubt, there seems to be times in which it is impossible to see clearly and yet we are forced to make a choice. The situations are, nonetheless, sometimes very meaningful afterwards and we may be surprised or dismayed with ourselves or with life upon remembering and understanding our own actions. What is central here is that meaning we find in our lives is not simply attributed to that which is clear and easy to understand, there is also the need to try and make sense of one's situation and of one's life. This seems to suggest that meaning is not found merely through seeing clearly, it is attained through the attempt to see clearly, to make sense and try and work things out.

In *Hamlet*, act four scene five, Ophelia, having become deranged by her fathers death and because of Hamlet's behaviour towards her, rants and raves and at one point utters the following words : “we know what we are, but know not what we may be.”. (*Hamlet*, William Shakespeare) These words echo a certain truth and meaningfulness in life in general and that is that the future is often shrouded in mystery, yet our own personal future is even more so. In fact it is a very powerful insight into the
human mind and existence that there is no clear way of perceiving who one might become or what might happen in life. Coupled with Rilke's words of not wanting to exclude that which is confusing because we cannot know what effect this may have in us, it could be possible to put forward the thought that clarity is only a perspective assumed by the one who is able to make sense of their own situation. This would mean that intellectual clarity, as seen from the platonic perspective, has if any then little meaning here, for it is not cognitive clearness that is of importance, although that cannot be excluded since cognitive clarity is most probably central to an understanding and insight into the meaning of one’s life. Yet it might be said that the ability to discover meaning in one's life involves more than a purely intellectual realisation, it involves the person as a whole. The individual who must come to terms with him- or herself and make decisions in life.

To sum up the discussion so far it could be said that confusion seems not only to be a part of life, it also appears to be an important aspect of the meaning we find in ourselves and in our lives. The temporal aspects of human existence also suggest that it is impossible to know with certainty what will happen in life. Yet in response to this one might say that it depends on what one means by “knowledge”, since clarity in life might not entail knowing all, but to know oneself and how to deal with new situations. This distinction could be seen to be a way of separating, for example, moral conviction from factual knowledge, in the sense that I might “know” that I will defend my friend if he is bullied at school, yet I cannot foresee how this will happen or know before hand all the “facts” about the situation. Yet even after making such a distinction between different kinds of knowledge and certainty about being clear of oneself and the world, there still seems to be a window for the possibility of change or divergence. In other words I may be certain of how I would act, yet when a situation presents itself I may act other than I had thought I would. Should this then be seen as weakness of will? Or should we maybe see it as the true moral stance one has?

To say as Ophelia does: “we know what we are, but know not what we may be.”, does not imply that we cannot reach cognitive clarity about who we are and what we are, it is a way of alluding to the fact that our journey in life is never at an end. In other words we may alter morally, existentially, and cognitively throughout life and even though we can grasp intellectually certain aspects of the changes we go through, some changes remain out of our grasp at the present. The reason for this may be because the changes are ahead of us, inside us, or have passed though us already. Yet grasping what is to be seen as a change or what choices change us, is a point of view, a perspective of our own lives. Some changes may seem more meaningful then others, some choices life altering, but this depends on the meaning we attribute them. This meaning, it might be said, cannot simply be
described in a cognitive grasp of our lives, given that we may be cognitively certain about who we are and still we can change both our conception of ourselves and our person through choices and actions.

In other words states of confusion seem not only to be present in life, they also seem to be inherent in the process of change. This may naturally be met with much objection, yet to better understand what this might mean it is important to discuss how we perceive our surroundings and how we choose to act in the face of what we see. The following discussion attempts, therefore, to fuse together the concepts perception, understanding, and meaning in the hope of showing how even that which we consider to be a choice might depend on both how clearly we see a situation and how much we try to see clearly.

3. Perceiving the world and making choices

In moral philosophy choices are often discussed as if life was a series of alternatives, yet it is seldom remarked that seeing something as a choice and understanding something as an option requires trying to see and understand. Choices are not simply presented as in philosophical examples, such as: you must choose between A or B, how do you decide? Questions as these neglect that it is also important to comprehend that what one does see or does not see as a choice is a way of perceiving the world and of making a stand. The actual choice we make is, therefore, both our reality and our attempt to stand for what we understand to be right. Making a choice might not have to include “knowing the good” but might be the attempt to make a stand for what “appears to be good”. Refusing to consider something as an option is also a choice and an expression of one's moral stance. Yet the examples, often debated in moral philosophy, of the kind that force a person to choose between a rock and a hard place, exempli gratia kill one human to save one hundred, are seen as rational experiments in morality. Here one might say that there is no choice to be made, since the options have already been set and the situation bears no resemblance to everyday life. True there might be situations in which a person is actually faced with such a horrendous choice, but what does this prove or illustrate about morality? In many ways it is far more interesting to see how someone might make neither choice and opt for a third way out, one that involves less bloodshed. Some might say that is not the point of the experiment, to which one could simply say that the experiment is corrupt from the start and does not clarify anything about morality, other than the fact that some will choose to do terrible things in difficult situations.
Returning to the idea that choice in life includes that which one perceives to be a choice and not simply an array of readymade alternatives, there seems to be a connection between morality and both meaning and perspective. In Oscar Wilde's novel *The picture of Dorian Grey* the main character Dorian Grey finds himself in a position where he may do and act as he pleases with no visible marks on his countenance. There is instead a painting of him which shows the stains of his character and the malformed features of his corruption, yet he walks the streets as young and bright as ever. Interestingly Mr. Grey acts upon every whim, every desire, want, or need that he has in life and becomes more and more degraded. There is no other than he who knows the true horror of his deeds in life, for they show not upon his face or in his manner. Through Dorian Grey, Oscar Wilde depicts a person who, having realised that he will not be altered in any outward way by his acts, seizes the opportunity to do what he would not otherwise do. He feels free from constraints. Yet might we imagine someone who would not behave as Dorian Grey does? Someone who upon realising that the painting shares such a mysterious bond with themselves, chooses not to act in any other way then they would normally? What is interesting, in other words, is that Dorian Grey sees the possibility to do as he pleases with no regard for others. How come the painting acts as enough of an incentive for him to behave the way he does? The answer might be said to lie, not so much in him choosing the wrong path, but that he saw the situation as an opportunity. In other words his fall from grace began the moment he understood his situation in the way he did and that he consequently chose to act upon that understanding.³

Through the platonic perspective we might say that Dorian Grey either failed to understand that what he was doing was wrong or that he understood yet failed act as he knew he should, he lacked will. An interesting alternative to the platonic and intellectual approach is to point out that Mr. Grey did not only misunderstand his own actions and their consequences, he misunderstood the meaning others had in his life. His choices showed how he perceived the worth of other human beings. Had he placed more worth in others he might never have acted in the way he did. This difference between an intellectual misunderstanding and a moral failing is a difference in meaning and might be explained by, for example, pointing out the difference between using a spoon in a manner unaccustomed at the dinner table and speaking rudely to another person. To act wrongly towards another might, in this way, be said to involve more or even to be completely different from a conceptual misunderstanding. In this way one might say that it is not that Dorian Grey fails to see

³ The example is used only to show the connection between perception and choice. The temptation to fall from grace, to belittle and neglect others is dealt with more thoroughly in chapter two, in connection with Lars Hertzberg's text *Gaita on recognising the human.*
that his acts hurts other, most likely he does make this cognitive connection, but it is that he fails to
recognise this as a deterrent from acting in the way he does. In other words he already possesses all
the so called “facts” about his situation and he does not seem weak off will, in fact he goes out of
his way in order to pursue his will. His failing might, therefore, be described as an inability to see
the moral aspects of his actions, which is different from his intellectual understanding of his actions.
One clear sign of this is the fact that he deflects feelings of guilt and remorse through his painting,
he does not let himself come to terms with his own actions.

Has this been an attempt to show that Dorian Grey is also confused? If so then only unintentionally,
since the main focus here has been to clarify that an individual’s understanding of the world and the
choices he or she makes, based upon that understanding, are comprised of more than cognitive
clarity. To exemplify this we might say that a person who defends their friend from a bully at school
does not only understand the situation, he or she decides to act. Another example is when I see a
colleague at work who seems depressed, yet I decide actively or passively to do nothing. In both
cases there are issues concerning responsibility, awareness, understanding, action, compassion, and
closeness, yet at the heart of all those terms lies the perspective one has, where one places oneself in
relation to another. The acting or not acting, the decision or the indecision must, therefore, be seen
in relation to the individuals ability, possibly even courage, to see others as important, to see
themselves as important, and maybe to praise friendship over other things. All these aspects delve
into much deeper waters then the purely intellectual; they touch upon moral and existential facts
about our lives.

In conclusion we might say that the main point has been to show how the world is not clear-cut into
that which is right and that which is wrong. How we perceive ourselves, others, our relationships,
and situations, all have bearing on how we understand what we might do and what we choose to do.
Choice might, therefore, be seen to not only show who we are, but also to represent our attempts to
decide what should be done or what we think must be done. Alternatively not choosing or choosing
unwisely also shows, as it were, our true colours. The main point is that choices are seldom as clear
cut as moral philosophy often tries to describe them, what is lacking in the descriptions is the many
dimensions and grey areas of human existence. More importantly is, however, the lack of emphasis
placed on understanding and meaning in our lives. Choices are instead looked upon as intellectual
problems or practical problems, which they naturally often are, yet the human element always
seems to be neglected. In some situations people are confronted with very difficult decisions and it
could be said to be a mistake to try and judge, from an outside perspective, what is right or wrong in
every circumstance. As for instance in the case of relationships, where determining how to act and behave can vary enormously depending on ones understanding of commitment, relationship, devotion, love, respect etc.

The contention is that the distinction between clarity and confusion is not as easily defined as, for example, platonic moral philosophy would have us believe. Also the view that morality basically consist of making choices that are either good or bad, seems not only to be a reductionist approach to human life, it also leans towards a misconception of the meaning of choice.

Allowing that confusion is part of the meaningfulness of making decisions in life there is, nonetheless, still the question of its relevance in making choices?

4. The weight of confusion and some concluding remarks

Earlier it was stated that possibly confusion should be seen as the road to clarity, yet what emphasis do we place upon confusion and what meaning is attributed to confusion by saying this? In response to this question one might ask another; what is meant by clarity? Is clarity the absence of confusion or is it perhaps the realisation that one is confused? Most likely there are both kinds. Clarity based on knowledge of one’s own confusion which may help one become unconfused, and clarity based on the absence of confusion. The critique of the platonic perspective given earlier was an attempt to show that the idea of complete clarity may in fact be another form of confusion, and an idealistic conception of clarity. What then is the alternative, to see confusion as a necessity of all thought and action? No, this is not the aim of this paper. Although it is the aim to show that morality cannot be understood without taking into account the many variations of doubt and confusion which saturate human existence.

One way of explaining the significance of confusion is by turning to a common analogy of life as walking upon a road. Through this picture we can describe clarity as knowing one’s position in the landscape and where one is either going or where one has come from. Clarity is, therefore, once again used as analogous with perception and understanding. From the platonic point of view one can see more and learn more by ascending to higher ground, the thought there is then that we should strive to the highest point we can find. Alternatively we might say that sometimes we find ourselves on higher ground and sometimes on lower ground, now and then we strive to a higher altitude and
sometimes we want a spot in the lowlands. The discussion about confusion and clarity is in other words not an attempt to say that we are either completely unclear or clear in our lives, or that we should be. It is an attempt to show that both clarity and confusion have the same weight and importance when it comes to the meaning of our lives. They are opposites and find meaning through being the contrast of each other.

Lastly I wish to put forwards the notion that what has been said in this text hints towards the view that morality could be viewed as nothing more than descriptions of ways of making sense of human existence, ranging from existential to practical matters in life. It is not a matter of striving towards perfection; morality is concerned with what we perceive and judge to be right or wrong, meaningful or without meaning in life.

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